The Purchase price report released in August 2004 by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) was the first publication of a significant amount of real transaction purchase data for antiretrovirals (ARVs). We did an observational study of the ARV transaction data in the Purchase price report to examine the procurement behaviour of principal recipients of Global Fund grants in developing countries. We found that, with a few exceptions for specific products (e.g. lamivudine) and regions (e.g. eastern Europe), prices in low-income countries were broadly consistent or lower than the lowest differential prices quoted by the research and development sector of the pharmaceutical industry. In lower middle-income countries, prices were more varied and in several instances (lopinavir/ritonavir, didanosine, and zidovudine/lamivudine) were very high compared with the per capita income of the country. In all low-and lower middle-income countries, ARV prices were still significantly high given limited local purchasing power and economic strength, thus reaffirming the need for donor support to achieve rapid scale-up of antiretroviral therapy. However, the price of ARVs will have to decrease to render scale-up financially sustainable for donors and eventually for governments themselves. An important first step in reducing prices will be to make available in the public domain as much ARV transaction data as possible to provide a factual basis for discussions on pricing. The price of ARVs has considerable implications for the sustainability of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) treatment in the developing world.
Introduction
Since the launch of the "3 by 5" initiat t tive by the WHO and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the number of people ret t ceiving antiretroviral (ARV) therapy has grown from about 300 000 at the end of 2002 to almost 1 000 000 halfway through 2005. 1 One of the key determit t nants of this growth has been increased funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund); the World Bank; the US Governt t ment; and other donors. However, despite increasing experience with bulk procurement, ARVs remain expensive. At the 2005 World Health Assembly in Geneva, multiple delegations from developing countries raised the issue of high ARV prices as an ongoing barrier to treatment access. Since affordable ARVs are critical to continuing the scaling up of treatment programmes it is important to monitor their prices.
In the past two years, very little actual ARV tender data have been pubt t lished. 2, 3 Most information has been in the form of indicative price quotes from the pharmaceutical industry published yearly by the Sources and Prices project 4 and the Médecins sans Frontières Camt t paign for Access to Essential Medicines. 5 A recent report on ARV pricing from the US Government also relied mainly on such quotes. 6 The Purchase price report 7 released in August 2004 by the Global Fund was the first publication of a significant body of real transaction pricing data. The report lists the prices and quantities of ARVs purchased by principal recipient organizations -the organizations that are legally responsible for distributing Global Fund grant money or using it to directly implet t ment programmes intended to tackle national burdens of HIV, malaria, or tuberculosis.
We have done an observational study of the ARV transaction data in the Purchase price report to examine the procurement behaviour of principal recipients. In addition, we investigated whether principal recipients were able to purchase ARVs at the widely advertised differential price quotes from research and development (R&D) firms (who usually hold the relevant patent rights on the product) or generic originator firms, in the case of fixedtdose comt t binations available only from these companies. 5 We selected 10 of the most commonly used adult formulation ARVs in treatment programmes in developing countries for which there were sufficient data. We did not consider paediatric formulations because the data were extremely scarce. 8 and the data are not independently verified by the Global Fund secretariat. The data are limited to source prices paid by bulk purchasers of ARVs, and do not repret t sent endtuser prices for patients. 9 Terms of trade and shipping costs for transact t tions were not consistently reported, so we did not include them in our study. Shipping and importation tariffs have previously been found to increase the price of medicines by no more than 15% over the factory price, which should not compromise the comparability of prices in this analysis. 2, 6, 10 In addition, while principal recipients must report additional transaction details -e.g. which procurement agent was used, if any, and whether the transaction price was part of a pretnegotiated agreement by another agency, like those arranged by the Clinton Foundation 11-13 -this information is not included in the public report. These data would probably help to gain a better understanding of why prices fall where they do.
Analysis of the Purchase price report

Results of the analysis
Current prices quoted by R&D or generic originator firms reflect reduct t tions in price quotes during the past 5 years subsequent to the introduction of generic ARVs on the open market. 5, 14 Every pharmaceutical company has its own criteria for countries to be eligible for the lowest differential price of ARVs; in most cases these are country income level and geographic location (e.g. whether the country is in subtSaharan Africa). GlaxoSmithKline has a policy of offering its lowest differential price to Global Fund grant recipients, and Merck and Roche even have a separate pricing level for middletincome count t tries. 5 For consistency, for every ARV studied we have selected the lowest quoted differential price level from the R&D or generic originator firm as the benchmark price. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 map the prices and suppliers for all transact t tions of the ARV products we selected. Each box represents one price at which there was at least one transaction, but for which there may have been multiple transactions at various quantities and for different principal recipients located in different countries.
Low-income countries
Prices for lowtincome countries ( companies. Therefore, in the poorest settings, generic competition seems eft t fective in reducing ARV prices -with notable exceptions such as lamivudine (3TC), for which both R&D and get t neric suppliers in several transactions priced their product well beyond the benchmark price. All transactions priced at least 10% higher than the benchmark took place in four countries, three of which (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and the Ret t public of Moldova) are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This finding suggests that phart t maceutical companies are strategically pricing their products in this region at levels more suitable for western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Russian Federt t ation. These data also affirm findings that high prices for ARVs are slowing access to antiretroviral therapy in the CIS count t tries. 15 Also of note is that the prices paid for nevirapine in lowtincome countries supplied by generic manufacturers were approximately three times (200%) lower than the benchmark from Boehringer Ingelheim, the originator, and thus we note that in this dataset there were no purchases of nevirapine from Boehringer Ingelheim made by principal recipients in lowtincome countries.
Lower middle-income countries
Prices in lower middletincome countries (Fig. 2) varied more than those for the same product in lowtincome countries, and there were several instances where significantly high prices were paid.
• Abbott Laboratories, whose lowest differential price for lopinavir/ritot t navir (Kaletra) is published as US$ 550, charged El Salvador and Peru between US$ 4468 and US$ 4511, respectively -over eight times (712-720%) more expensive than the benchmark, and over double the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in each of these countries. 16 • BristoltMeyers Squibb priced didant t osine (Videx) more than five times (432%) higher than the benchmark in El Salvador, and priced stavudine (Zerit) nearly 22 times (2063%) over their own benchmark in Honduras.
• GlaxoSmithKline priced zidovudine/ lamivudine (Combivir) as high as 11 times (1030%) the benchmark of US$ 237 per patienttyear in one transaction in Honduras.
Only two of the 11 transactions in lower middletincome countries that were priced at least three times (400%) higher than the benchmark were sourced from generic producers. Hetero priced stavudine at US$ 1351 per patienttyear in Honduras, nearly 25 times (2356%) the benchmark price, but for a total volume of only 60 units. Another firm, Strides, priced lopinavir/ritonavir at US$ 4687 per patienttyear for Cuba -8.5 times (752%) the reference price. Howt t ever, this price might reflect a supplier 
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Further analyses
Though limited, these data show that several R&D companies are pricing ARVs higher for lower middletincome regions where they face little or no comt t petition from the generic industry. Possit t ble explanations for these uncompetitive markets include strong patent protection in countries that are members of the World Trade Organization, and issues of registration and marketing of generic drugs. Lower middletincome nations are often as financially constrained as their lowtincome counterparts. For example, the GDP per capita for Ukraine (US$ 851), officially a lower middletincome economy, approximates that of Angola (US$ 857) and the Congo (US$ 825) -both lowtincome nations. 16 Economic indicators for some better performing lower middletincome nations can be deceptive because of high levels of int t come inequality. For instance, Namibia has a per capita GDP of US$ 1463, but the wealthiest 20% of the population represent nearly 80% of total national income. 16 Continued exploitation of these markets and their exclusion from differential pricing schemes could have serious ramifications on access to antirett t roviral therapy in these countries -in the short term as coverage expands and in the long term as the number of pat t tients in need of treatment increases.
Some transactions, seemingly outt t liers, took place at extremely low prices in both lowt and lower middletincome countries. These prices were often onettime, small purchases intended to help establish a relationship between a principal recipient organization and a particular supplier of ARVs. These transactions can also reveal bottlenecks in the procurement and importation end of the pharmaceutical supply chain. For example, GlaxoSmithKline's price of US$ 29 per patienttyear for lamivudine to Honduras was approximately 58% lower than their benchmark of US$ 69. However, only 3000 total units were purchased at this price; the price was higher in subsequent transactions bet t tween GlaxoSmithKline and Honduras of larger quantities. Similar examples include pricing for the fixedtdose comt t bination of stavudine/lamivudine/net t virapine (d4T/3TC/NVP) from Cipla and efavirenz from Merck. These prices should not be considered typical.
While lowtincome countries prot t cured more nevirapine than efavirenz -both commonly used drugs in the same class (nontnucleoside reverse trant t scriptase inhibitors, NNRTIs) -lower middletincome countries purchased more efavirenz than nevirapine. Includt t ing fixedtdose combinations, lowtincome countries procured nearly eight times the amount of nevirapine versus efavirenz (2 784 900 versus 352 800 units) while lower middletincome countries bought almost 2.5 times the amount of efavit t renz versus nevirapine (3 459 600 versus 1 467 840 units). This difference might be explained by the price difference between efavirenz and nevirapine ( Fig.  1 and Fig. 2 ), in addition to the lack of fixedtdose combinations containing efavirenz. Another reason for the differt t ence could be concerns about the use of efavirenz in populations of women who do not have access to reliable contracept t tion, since it has been linked to birth defects if used in early pregnancy.
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Conclusions
Our analysis highlights issues that will grow in importance with the continued scaling up of ARV therapy. ARV prices must be reduced further to reach the goal of the intermediate framework of 3 million people on treatment, and ultimately to ensure universal access to ARV therapy. Persistently high prices for ARVs continue to slow the scaling up of treatment for HIV/AIDS in the develt t oping world. Our identification of sigt t nificant problems and inconsistencies in ARV procurement and pricing from this small and incomplete dataset illust t trates the importance of ensuring that ARV procurement data are in the pubt t lic domain and reinforces the need for timely reporting of these transactions. A solid evidence base on pricing could empower the developing world to make costteffective procurement choices, a critical factor in the longtterm sustaint t ability of treatment for HIV/AIDS within these countries. O Descubrimos que, exceptuando sólo algunos productos (como la lamivudina) y regiones (por ejemplo Europa oriental), los precios en los países de bajos ingresos eran en general similares o inferiores a los precios diferenciales más bajos citados por el sector de investigación y desarrollo de la industria farmacéutica. En los países de ingresos medianos bajos, los precios eran más variados y en algunos casos (lopinavir/ ritonavir, didanosina y zidovudina/lamivudina) eran muy altos en comparación con los ingresos por habitante del país. En todos los países de ingresos bajos o medianos bajos, los precios de los ARV eran todavía significativamente altos, considerando el nivel económico y el limitado poder adquisitivo local, lo que confirma la necesidad de conseguir apoyo de donantes para expandir rápidamente el tratamiento antirretroviral. Sin embargo, el precio de los ARV tendrá que disminuir si se quiere que la expansión sea económicamente sostenible para los donantes y, en definitiva, para los propios gobiernos. Un primer e importante paso para reducir los precios consistirá en hacer de dominio público todos los datos posibles sobre transacciones de ARV, proporcionando así una base objetiva para las discusiones sobre la fijación de precios. Del precio de los ARV depende en gran medida la sostenibilidad de la terapia contra el virus de la inmunodeficiencia humana/ síndrome de inmunodeficiencia adquirida (VIH/SIDA) en el mundo en desarrollo.
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